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COMMENTS
FTC 5 AND ROBINSON-PATMAN: UNFAIR METHOD OF
LEGISLATION OR FAIR METHOD OF
ADMINISTRATION
The performance of Federal Administrative Agencies is perpetually
a topic for conversation among the legal profession. Receiving more than
its share of colloquy is the Federal Trade Commission's exercise of the
power conferred upon it by FTC 5.
Congress vested the Commission with a broad and flexible mandate.
But it did not endow it with the power to legislate. In the final
analysis a democracy cannot permit its laws to be rewritten by ad-
ministrative agencies or the executive. Where administration dis-
closes defects or limitations in the laws drafted by Congress with
which the techniques of interpretation are unable to cope, the remedy
is to request supplemental legislation from the elected representatives
of the people who, under our system of government, are the final
arbiters of national policy.'
and
The words 'unfair competition' can grow and broaden and mold
themselves to meet circumstances as they arise .... 2
The deficiencies of the Robinson-Patman Act have been decried by
what must be an endless number of commentators and, judging from
the content of the criticism, angry commentators. Dispensing with an
involved study of Robinson-Patman as being superfluous, the issue that
commands this comment's attention is whether Section 53 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act can be employed by the Commission when a
discriminatory practice does not come within the purview of the Robinson-
Patman Act because of a technical omission which denies jurisdiction to
the regulatory body under that statute. The lines of intellectual battle
have been drawn, as emphasized in the above statements by Professor
Handler and Senator Cummins, around two very different philosophies
of the law. One advocates the adherence to a literal interpretation of
statutes by administrative agencies and the other condones a dynamic
1. Handler, Review of Anti-Trust Developments., 17 TnE RECORD 408 (1962).
Judge Moore quoted this passage in his dissenting opinion in American News Co. v.
FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962) ; cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
2. 51 CONG. Rtc. 12871 (1914). (Comments of Senator Cummins.)
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interpretation of statutes as befits the time of its enforcement and the
purpose of the legislation.
Seeking to provide justification for such dynamic interpretation, the
Commission adopted the "spirit test"4 in Grand Union in order to vindi-
cate the use of Section 5, and thereby clarified the issues, leading to a
full discussion of the situation.
I.
LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF FTC 5 AND ROBINSON-PATMAN 5
The inadequacy of the Sherman Act led to the passage of the Clayton
Act and Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.6 The FTC Act
created the FTC and granted it authority to enjoin "unfair methods
of competition" as well as to implement the express sanctions of the
Clayton Act.7 A Senate Committee Report confirms the impression that
Congress deliberately left the phrase "unfair methods of competition"
undefined in order that new practices, harmful to competition, might
be controlled. The Committee's dilemma arose in deciding whether they
would endeavor to define the myriad array of unfair practices found in
commerce or rather include only a general declaration of prohibition and
thereby leave the determination to the Commission. The Senate Com-
mittee decided that the latter course was more realistic for the achieve-
ment of effective and comprehensive legislation.8
The conference Report emphasized the intended flexibility of the
phrase "unfair methods of competition" by remarking:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.
There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all
known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it
would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to
adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.
4. Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382, 422-23 (1960). Commissioner Secrest's
majority opinion contained these remarks:
We think that the most that can be said on this point from the legislative history
and from a reading of the Act itself is that the practice charged in the complaint
is not specifically prohibited by the Act. Certainly it cannot be inferred from this
fact that Congress countenanced a practice which so clearly violates the spirit of
the statute.... it is our opinion that it is the duty of the Commission to 'supple-
ment and bolster' Section 2 of the amended Clayton Act by prohibiting under
Section 5 practices which violate the spirit of the amended Act. (Emphasis added.)
5. § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
6. See, Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act as an Anti-Trust Law, 5 ANTi-TRusT BULL. 161, 162-63 (1960). The FTC
Act became law on Sept. 26, 1914. The Clayton Act became law on Oct. 15, 1914.
7. See, S. Rsp. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The original statute had no substantive sanctions. The
Senate added affirmative power to stop unfair methods of competition and depleted
the express prohibitions of the Clayton Act as being redundant. The final delegation
of power to the Commission resulted from a compromise between the Senate and
House Conferees. One might wonder how the FTC Act was meant to bolster the
Clayton Act when the FTC Act was passed first. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) ; S. Rip. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
8. S. R&s. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
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It is also practically impossible to define unfair practices so that
the definition will fit business of every sort in every part of the
country. Whether competition is unfair or not generally depends upon
the surrounding circumstances of the particular case. What is harmful
under certain circumstances may be beneficial under different cir-
cumstances.9
The Clayton Act was the second half of the legislation passed by
Congress in 1914 to combat threats to competition. The Commission
was given the responsibility for the enforcement of the Clayton Act,10
which seemed to check the wide scope of authority granted by Section
5 through the listing of express prohibitions.
Motivated by problems originating from the practice of price dis-
crimination, Congress passed the Clayton Act" which has subsequently
been amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.' 2 The 1914 legislation was
haunted by a proviso which excluded price discriminations made "in
good faith to meet competition." The twenty year period until the Robin-
son-Patman Amendment was to justify the fears of Congress that they
were diluting the force of the statute by the addition of that proviso.
Finally, Congress requested the FTC to investigate the matter.'8 In
recommending that the law be amended the Commission stated:
Should the trend of the past 20 years and particularly of the last
decade continue for a like period, we shall have a condition in some
lines of chain-store merchandising that few will dispute is monopo-
listic.' 4
The Commission's report confirmed the suspicion that the main
reason for the Act's failure to effectively control price discrimination
was the provision that allowed sellers to defend on the ground that they
were meeting competition in good faith. After a number of bills were
introduced to surmount the deficiency in the original Clayton Act, the
House Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably on the Patman
bill:
. . . the existing law has in practice been too restrictive in requiring
a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line
of commerce concerned, whereas the more immediately important
concern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimina-
tion. Only through such injury in fact can the larger general injury
9. H.R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
10. For further explanation and study of the legislative history of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act see, HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1924); Levy, The Clayton Act - An Imperfect Supplement to the
Sherman Law, 3 VA. L. REv. 411 (1916) ; Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition,
25 YALE L.J. 20 (1915).
11. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
12. Supra note 6.
13. S. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
14. The Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain Store Investiga-
tion, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
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result. Through this broadening of the jurisdiction of the act, a
more effective suppression of such injuries is possible and the more
effective protection of the public interest at the same time is achieved.15
The Robinson-Patman Amendment divided Section 2 of the Clayton
Act into six sub-parts. Section 2(a)16 is the basic price discrimination
proscription. To establish a prima facie case under 2(a), one must
show sales of the same product to two different buyers at different prices
and that the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce," or may be "to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition."7 It has been held to be unnecessary
to show that the different customers of a seller, who are charged different
prices, are competing buyers.' 8 Section 2(b) 19 contains one of the three
affirmative defenses available to the respondent charged with a 2(a) viola-
tion - the good faith meeting of an equally low price of a competitor. 20
The other two defenses, supplied by Section 2(a), are changing market
conditions 21 and cost justification.22
Section 2(c) 23 is the so-called "brokerage clause." The section ren-
ders unlawful a payment of anything of value as a commission, brokerage,
or other compensation, or "any allowance or discount in lieu thereof,"
either to the other party or to an intermediary, except for services
rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods. 24 The purpose
of the section is to prevent sellers and sellers' brokers from yielding to
the pressures exerted by a large buyer. Section 2(d) 25 deals with dis-
crimination in payments for, or the furnishing of, advertising or other
merchandising services or facilities. The requirement that the furnishing
of facilities or equipment be done on a proportionally equal basis is the
aim of Section 2(e). 26
Section 2(f) 21 concerns itself with buyer liability for the receipt
of discriminations. This section was rendered useless by Automatic Can-
15. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) ; S. RE:P. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1935).
16. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
17. This section covers both primary line injury (competitive effects on the seller
level) and secondary line injury (competitive effects on the customer level).
18. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
19. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
20. The discriminating seller is allowed to discriminate as long as lie can show
that it was in "good faith." See, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231 (1951).
21. This defense is virtually useless due to the overwhelming demands of the.
required proof. This defense is part of 2(a).
22. See, Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
23. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
24. FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
25. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958).
The section is directed toward payments by the seller to the buyer for such things as
cabinets, salesmen, or promotional advertising.
26. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958).
See, Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55 (1959); Atlanta Trading Corp.
v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
27. Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958).
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teen.28 The rationale of that decision was that the party bringing the
action must show, not only that the buyer knowingly received the benefits
of price discriminations, but also that the discriminations were not justified
under any of the defensive provisions in 2(a) or 2(b). The final death
toll for 2(f) was contained in the Court's interpretation that, absent justi-
fication, the party bringing the action must exhibit that the buyer knew
or should have known that no such defense would be available to the
seller.
Congress passed the Patman and Robinson bills overwhelmingly.
Only sixteen opposition votes were recorded in the House of Representa-
tives while none were recorded in the Senate. The legislation was enacted
on June 16, 1936 and President Roosevelt signed the Robinson-Patman
Act on June 19, 1936.29 Although Congress' purpose in enacting the
Act was to make all injurious price discrimination unlawful, legislative
perspicuity should have foretold the advent of new inadvertent authorship
deficiencies as well as further loopholes arising from judicial interpreta-
tion.3 0
II.
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF SECTION 5
Any belief entertained by the FTC that they were to have a free
hand, due to their wide statutory authorization, was soon dispelled by
the Supreme Court. In the celebrated Gratz case,3 ' an order of the
Commission forbidding the combination sale of cotton ties and bagging
by a manufacturer as an "unfair method of competition" under Section 5
was set aside by the Supreme Court. The basic rationale for the Court's
refusal to accept the Commission's order was that neither monopolistic
design nor monopoly was shown. The Court also added:
The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the
statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. [t is for the courts,
not the commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what
they include. They are clearly inapplicable to practices never here-
28. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). For the test developed
by the Court see note 60, infra.
29. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 10 (1963).
30. For further study of the legislative history of Robinson-Patman see, PATMAN,
COMPLETE GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1963) ; RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINA-
TION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962). A scathing criticism of the
Robinson-Patman Act was delivered by Dean Landis to President-elect Kennedy.
Part of that report is as follows:
• . . the Robinson-Patman Act is an extremely poorly drafted statute. The scope
of its operation has been muddled rather than clarified by court decisions. Nor
has the Federal Trade Commission been able to fabricate clear standards out of
its melange of generalities, qualified by proviso upon proviso. Remedial devices
in this field can only be had from Congress, which must make up its mind as to
what this legislation is really intended to accomplish. Some better analyses of
these problems could, however, be made by the Federal Trade Commission.
Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, Sub-committee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (Com. Print, 1960).
31. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
COMMENTS
5
Brodkin: FTC 5 and Robinson-Patman: Unfair Method of Legislation or Fair M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized
by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or against public policy
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition
or create monopoly. The act was certainly not intended to fetter free
and fair competition as commonly understood and practiced by honor-
able opponents in trade. 32 [Emphasis added.]
The creative powers of the Commission were stifled for at least
two decades in the rigidity of interpretation demanded by the Court.
In 1934, the Court repudiated the restrictive interpretation of the Gratz
decision and freed Section 5 from the chains of common law prohibitions
and Sherman Act violations for defining "unfair trade practices." 33
The 1940's witnessed an expansion in the application of Section 5
flowing from the dicta of Supreme Court decisions in all Clayton Act
areas.3 4 A group boycott by the garment industry was prohibited in the
Fashion Originator's Guild case.35 The Commission's use of Section 5
was upheld by Mr. Justice Black as he alluded to the evident illegality.
of the boycott when correlated to the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
When the ". . . purpose and practice runs counter to the public policy
declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission
has the power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition.13 6 The
majority opinion suggested that, perhaps, Section 5 had a greater scope
than the total prohibitive effect of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Mr. Justice Black was also responsible for the majority opinion in
the 1948 Cement Institute decision.3 7 The Section 5 prohibition issued
by the Commission was founded upon a price fixing charge. Appeal
was filed, contesting the Commission's jurisdiction, since the first count
of the complaint was descriptive of a Sherman Act violation. 3 The
Court found sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding of
a combination, but, in a footnote, enunciated that this "does not mean
that existence of a 'combination' is an indispensable ingredient of an
'unfair method of competition' under the FTC Act."13 9
The Fashion Guild and Cement Institute opinions of Mr. Justice Black
became the cornerstone for the forward step taken in Motion Picture
Advertising Service,40 where the Court observed:
The 'unfair methods of competition' which are condemned by Section
5 (a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common
32. Id. at 427-28. For an application of the Gratz doctrine see, FTC v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
33. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934): "Neither the
language nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to confine the
forbidden methods to fixed and unyielding categories." See also, FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643 (1931).
34. Howrey, supra note 7 at 170.
35. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
36. Id. at 463.
37. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
38. Id. at 689-93.
39. Id. at 721 n.4.
40. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The
FTC employed Section 5 to prohibit the acquisition of exclusive exhibitor's rights.
[VOL. 11
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law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act. . . . Congress
advisedly left the concept flexible to be defined with particularity
by the myriad of cases from the field of business. 41
But the opinion's greatest impact came from the intimation by the Court
that trade practices which potentially transgressed both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts could be stopped in their incipient stages under Section 5.
Since the Clayton Act already allowed an incipiency stoppage,42 fear
arose that an extreme test of minimal standards was being advocated. 43
However, the expanded use of Section 5, to reach conduct not pro-
hibited under the Clayton Act, still demands an evidentiary framework
and a showing of anti-competitiveness comparable to that required by
the Clayton Act. Actually, the increased use of Section 5 by the Com-
mission has been concentrated upon behavior of the type outlawed by
the Clayton Act, but not within the itemized provisions of that statute.
For example, promotional allowances are violative of Section 2(d) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. But Section 2(d) contains no sanction for
the large buyer, who is an integral party in any such transaction, and
Section 2(f), the buyer liability section, has been interpreted as excluding
a 2(d) violation. In light of this statutory imperfection, the Commission
has initiated the use of Section 5 to encompass the buyer, who is as guilty
as the seller, if not more so - in fact, it is usually the buyer's leverage
that activates the illegal transaction.
III.
Grand Union AND ITS AFTERMATH
In recent years, the Commission has attempted to use Section 5 to
circumvent the Automatic Canteen4 4 requirement that Section 2(f) of
41. Id. at 394.
42. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931); Dictograph
Products v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1954). Section 3 of the Clayton Act
condemns sales or agreements where the effect of such sale or contract of sale
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. . . . But
we do not think that the purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit the mere
possibility of the consequences described. It was intended to prevent such agreements
as would under the circumstances disclosed probably lessen competition, or create an
actual tendency to monopoly." (Emphasis added.) Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922). See also, FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 46, n.14 (1948). A Section 2 (Robinson-Patman) violation does not require
a showing that actual injury to competition occurred but only that there is a reasonable
possibility that respondent's behavior "may" have such an effect. See also 10 VILL.
L. REv. 734 at 780, for a discussion of the incipiency doctrine as it is appied to the
merger provision of Clayton. i
43. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Motion Picture Advertising is actually an
excellent essay on administrative principles pertaining to the Commission. The essence
of the dissent is that the determination of the scope of Section 5 was left for ascertain-
ment by the Court. And if not, "the curb on the Commission's power would be re-
laxed, and unbridled intervention into business practices encouraged. . . . [H]e is no
friend of administrative law who thinks that the Commission should be left at large."
44. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's decision placed so strenuous a burden of proof upon the Commission that 2(f)
became, for all intents and purposes, inoperative.
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Robinson-Patman be applied only to the knowing receipt of discrimina-
tions in price but not to the knowing receipt of allowances. 45
The debate over the Commission's actions began in earnest when
Grand Union46 raised the issue of whether Section 5 could be used when
a discriminatory practice fails to come within the Robinson-Patman Act
due to a deficiency in its proscriptive language. The Commission's com-
plaint proposed that a buyer's liability under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act applied only to a price discrimination under 2(a) and does
not include a 2(d) promotional allowance or a 2(e) services or facilities
violation.47  Section 5 was invoked to remedy the gap in jurisdiction. 4s
The Commission did not use the usual statutory interpretation techniques
to harmonize the use of Section 5 with the failure of the buyer's liability
section - 2(f) - to include 2(d) allowance violations. Rather, the
majority expounded a rationale that went further than some thought
proper and presented a major weapon for potential use by the Commission.
After reviewing the legislative history of Robinson-Patman, the
majority found that Congress primarily sought to combat the use of
leverage by large buyers as a means of inducing discriminatory promo-
tional concessions from suppliers. From this finding, the "spirit test"
was derived. 49 In fact, Commissioner Tait's dissent was based on his
distrust of the word "spirit." 50
45. J. Weingarten, Inc., No. 7714, FTC, Aug. 13, 1963; American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., No. 7835, FTC, Dec. 21, 1961; Benner Tea Co., No. 7866,
FTC, July 25, 1961; Individualized Catalogues, Inc., No. 7971, FTC, Sept. 26, 1962;
Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., No. 6459, FTC, June 1, 1961; Foster Publishing
Co., No. 7698, FTC, July 26, 1962; Food Fair Stores, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 392 (1957)
United Cigar - Whalen Stores Corp., 53 F.T.C. 102 (1956).
46. Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960) ; Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1962).
47. See, Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Coln-
mission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. Rgv. 821, 839 (1961).
48. Commissioner Secrest stated:
In the absence of evidence of Congressional intent not to render unlawful prac-
tices related to those specifically prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, there
is no substance to respondent's argument that the Federal Trade Commission Act
cannot be extended to proscribe discriminatory practices which do not come
within the purview of the Robinson-Patman Act. The rule of statutory construc-
tion is that general and specific statutes should be read together and harmonized,
if possible, and that the specific statute will prevail over the general only to the
extent that there is conflict between them. There is no dispute as to whether the
specific provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act are controlling insofar as they
specifically prohibit certain practices. There is nothing in the Act itself, however,
which conflicts with the Commission's broad authority under Section 5 to define
and proceed against practices which it deems to be unfair, including those which
may come within the periphery of the later Act, although not within its letter.
49. Supra note 5.
50. Commissioner Tait stated his position in this most entertaining manner:
... thousands of businessmen must first determine if the business practice is legal
under the Robinson-Patman Act. Then they must also determine whether the
practice is legal under a vague standard, herein stated to be 'the spirit of the
amended Act.' I am in vigorous disagreement with an approach to the law which
has too much sail and too little anchor, or too much supplement and too little bolster.
Grand Union could have been decided on the theory that it was an inadvertent con-
gressional failure rather than deliberate casus omissus that 2(d) was not included in
the coverage of 2(f). See, CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 169 (1940)
2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4924 (3d ed. 1943).
[VOL. 11
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The majority indicated that the power they enunciated in Grand
Union extended to the prohibition of such a practice without a showing
of adverse effects on competition where the practice had been construed
as a "per se" violation.5' The dissent stated that the Commission was
assuming legislative power as well as departing from the statutory re-
quirement that "probable injury to competition" be shown.
It does seem, however, that every argument the Commission made
in Grand Union to justify the use of Section 5 could as well be cast in the
face of its decisions holding that the "meeting competition" defense was
unavailable in Section 2(c) and 2(d) cases. Simplicity Pattern52 upheld
the Commission ruling that the defenses of cost justification and that
of the effect on competition apply only to 2(a) and not to 2(c), (d),
or (e). Balance seems lacking in this type of arrangement, as seen by
the following statement of the Commission:
We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted. 53
A recent case54 used a philosophy formerly espoused by the Com-
mission, that of denial of the meeting competition defense - 2(b) - to
sellers whose products were in greater public demand, to reverse a cease
and desist order of the Commission based on a 2(a) violation. The
court remarked that "we cannot approve of the Commission's construing
the Act inconsistently from one case to the next as appears most advan-
tageous to its position in a particular case." 55
American Newvs Co. v. FTC56 was decided on the same day
as the Grand Union case. American News had appealed an order of
the FTC directing them to "cease and desist from inducing, receiving,
or contracting to receive any payment for sales services which suppliers were
forbidden by Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, to make."57 The Court of Appeals held that a buyer who
knowingly solicited and received from a supplier such improper pro-
motional allowances as were forbidden by 2(d) was engaged in unfair
methods of competition in violation of the FTC Act.58 The court reiterated
the Grand Union philosophy. Acknowledging that Section 2(d) does
not, of itself, include buyers, the court found that the omission was not
51. Sections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) of Robinson-Patman are considered "per se"
violations.
52. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). There is an argument
that if all sections of Robinson-Patman had defenses, the Act would be too difficult
to enforce and for that reason only Section 2(a) violations have the right of defense.
53. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6966 (Oct. 31, 1960).
54. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
55. Id. at 138-39. An answer to the court's reasoning would be that a 2(b)
defense is a matter of legislative grace and that while consumer public acceptance is
used in the 2(b) area it should not be used for jurisdictional purposes, as in Borden.
56. 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
57. Ibid.
58. The News Company was in a position of near dominance. While they had 930
newsstands, their largest competitor had but 57. Supra note 47, at 107.
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"purposeful". Since the buyer plays an important role in the transaction,
he is part of the evil the Act was designed to correct. The court reasoned
that the Congressional declaration, that the use of large buying- power
to obtain price discriminations was against public policy, justified the use
of FTC 5. The test set down in Automatic Canteen 9 was extended to
other similar FTC 5 proceedings.
The novel allegations found in R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC0 con-
cerned the use of buying power leverage by Macy to encourage contribu-
tions from sellers for the store's 100th anniversary celebration. Though
the store rendered no direct promotional service for the vendor's product,
the court upheld the order on the basis that the activity constituted a
Section 5 violation. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether
Macy's conduct was coercive or whether Section 5 authorized the Com-
mission to prohibit any trade practice which it believes to be in contra-
vention of Robinson-Patman. Reasoning that Macy's inducement of the
seller's 2(d) violation sufficed, the conclusion emerged that where "activity"
runs "counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, the FTC has power to suppress it as an 'unfair method of competi-
tion'."61 The court also noted that a buyer who induces a vendor to
commit a violation of § 2(d) by soliciting special promotional and ad-
vertising payments has committed a per se violation of the FTC Act.
In light of the above cases it is most perplexing to consider what
the Commission reported in 1934:
It does not follow, however, that a discrimination in price which
falls short of the first (Section 2 of the Clayton Act) may be attacked
under the second (Section 5). . . . The point cannot be overlooked
that if price discrimination was included under the general prohibition
of unfair methods of competition when the FTC Act was passed,
the latter expression of legislative will in the Clayton Act dealt
specifically and in detail with the subject and would therefore seem
to take precedence over the more general statutory prohibition.
62
The only explanation for this reversal of opinion by the Commission
is that they are but a compendium of the time and people they serve.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The FTC was established by Congress in 1914 to protect business
and the public against unfair methods of competition and to prevent
59. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). The test determines
whether the buyer has knowledge that the payments he induces and receives are illegal.
The court in American News went on to say that the knowledge need not be proven by
direct evidence; circumstantial evidence may suffice. For factors considered sufficient
to prove knowledge see, supra note 56, at 110.
60. 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
62. Supra note 15, at 65.
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practices which would lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.
The Commission is, in short, charged with the basic duty of pro-
tecting our competitive free-enterprise system.68
After the Gratz64 decision of 1920 was put to rest by Keppel,6 5 the
expansive use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act became
a source of discussion for both worried conservatives and jubilant progres-
sives in the anti-trust field. This extensive use of Section 5 has wrought
problems on the one hand, at the same time that it has provided solutions
on the other.
The criticisms66 leveled at the Commission's increasing use of Section
5 usually take the form of harangues against the uncertainty of the law :07
The illegalities are too difficult to define since "spirit" as well as "sub-
stance" is now a proper basis for an FTC 5 order. The commission amends
on an ad hoc or ex post facto basis. Assuring compliance with the law
requires that there be both certainty and fairness in the law. When
limitations are found in the Congressional language, the Commission
may, if unable to overcome the deficiencies by statutory construction,
employ the vague guidelines inherent in the phrase "unfair method of
competition" as an independent reservoir of power.
It is now obvious that FTC 5 may be used to plug loopholes. Certain
practices are well known to be repugnant to competition. A buyer who
solicits price discrimination is on notice that he is soliciting prohibited
activity. The quality of legislation can be evaluated only after its imple-
mentation. The major accomplishment of the current use of Section 5
is that it enables the Commission to correct the unforeseen inadequacies
of legislation caused by Congressional oversight.
Although counselling has become more difficult with the development
of Section 5, Grand Union seems to announce two tests which must
63. FTC Reg. A, 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1960) (Origin and Purpose of the Commission).
64. Supra note 32.
65. Supra note 34.
66. Criticism is prevalent at the debut of any innovation. When the project of an
administrative commission to regulate competition in interstate commerce was first
under consideration, so distinguished a lawyer as W. B. Hornblower, Esq., said, in
the course of an address before the American Bar Association:
These schemes for control by executive action . . . are, I submit, repugnant to our
American traditions and principles. It has always been our boast that no one
should be condemned except by the courts after an opportunity to be heard, and
upon competent testimony. . . It seems to me incredible that the American
people should consent to have their acts approved or condemned and their property
rights and their business rights licensed or outlawed by executive mandate. If
this is to become a government by executive edict or by bureaucratic domination, the
days of republican institutions are certainly numbered. I for one am not prepared
to admit that we are reduced to this extremity. 36 Reports Amer. Bar Ass'n 304,
325-36 (1911).
67. "What is an unfair method or practice within subsection (a) of this section(§ 45) is a matter of judgment in determination of which weight must be given to the
expert judgment of the Commission." Mytinger and Casselberry, Inc. v. F.T.C., 301
F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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be met in order for FTC 5 to be employed by the Commission. The
practice being attacked must be closely similar to, and parallel to, one
that is prohibited by the Clayton Act, but which does not come within
the purview of that statute because of a technical omission. And there
must be some evidence that Congress did not mean to countenance the
practice being examined. 6
The Grand Union rationale might extend to such areas as agency
or bailment transactions and services where price discrimination or exclu-
sive dealing practices similar to those proscribed by the Clayton Act
are present.69 But it should be noticed that the qualitative standards
prescribed by Congress for the Clayton Act are in no way lessened by
the Grand Union decision.
A distinguished commentator 70 in the anti-trust area has suggested
guides for harmonizing Section 5 with the Clayton Act in jurisdictional
deficiency cases. First, when a practice is covered by the specific pro-
visions of the Clayton Act, the action should be brought under that
statute. Second, when a technical jurisdictional deficiency makes it
necessary for the Commission to use Section 5 in dealing with a practice
analogous to a Clayton violation, standards of proof should parallel those
that would be maintained for the Clayton proceeding. Third, when the
Commission asserts a Section 5 violation in the same complaint with a
Clayton violation, separate and non-redundant counts should be used.
There should also be identification of the particular statutory provisions.
Finally, Section 5 should never be used for practices specifically within
the prohibitions of the Clayton Act.71
It is apparent that our complex economic system requires a regulatory
body with powers broad enough to confront new situations. The use of
Section 5 in dealing with problems in the Robinson-Patman area is an
example of the development that has made the Commission a body capable
of handling novel devices that are harmful to competition. Those who fret
that the Commission might translate their statutory authority into a dis-
play of raw power have the inherent safety of judicial review with which to
allay their fears. The intention of Congress to make the Commission
an instrument to effect flexible administrative determinations in the light
of administrative expertise and future experience is achieving fruition.
Jeffrey Averett Brodkin
68. Rahl, Does Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Extend the Clayton
Act? 5 ANTI-TRUST BULL. 533, 547-48 (1960).
69. See, Handler, Recent Anti-Trust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 93 (1961).
70. Supra note 47, at 851.
71. Supra note 47, at 851.
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